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Therefore, 3: 1's requirement to disclose twenty-one days before
trial, an intention to call an expert to testify in the penalty trial is only
enforceable if the defense counsel's intentions are in fact certain. If
they are not, the defense cannot be compelled to assess the value of the
expert's testimony before the moment in which the expert will be
called. More accurately in the context of a capital case, a state may not
compel a defendant to surrender sixth, eighth, and fourteenth
amendment rights if he wants to assert his Fifth Amendment rights. 19
Virginia's 3:1 does not only threaten preclusion of defense
evidence for failing to notify the Commonwealth of an intention to use
expert testimony, 3:1 also threatens preclusion of defense expert
testimony if the defendant does not cooperate with an independent
Commonwealth's expert evaluation of the defendant, as provided in
subsection F.20 The defense should ensure that the Commonwealth's
evaluation is in fact independent by refraining from disclosing any of
the defense reports required by subsections C and D until after the
Commonwealth's evaluation has taken place.
Second, the statute limits the scope of this independent exami-
nation to the "existence or absence of mitigating circumstances
relating to the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense."
21
By definition, then, the evaluation cannot include inquiry into future
dangerousness. In addition, the defendant should be warned that the
Commonwealth's expert is not permitted to go into issues of unrelated
acts or crimes.
This warning is especially important because subsection G
precludes the Commonwealth's use of any of defendant's statements,
or evidence derived from the defendant's statements or disclosures, in
its case-in-chief. "Such statements or disclosures shall be admissible
in rebuttal only when relevant to issues in mitigation raised by the
defense."'22 As a practical matter, before the Commonwealth makes
any use at the penalty trial of information gained through 3:1, defense
counsel should request a side-bar and verify exactly what issues in
mitigation have been raised by the defense as a means of narrowing
what the Commonwealth may rebut.
Although 3: 1's initial qualifying requirements are not difficult to
meet, as compared to an Ake request, the subsequent statutory re-
quirements expose the defense case in mitigation to some pretrial
discovery by the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the assistance pro-
vided in 3:1, properly utilized, may be crucial for a capital defendant
and defense attorneys should not be scared away by its potential
pitfalls. Rather, a structured strategy should be undertaken to give the
Commonwealth no more than the statute clearly requires and the
Constitution permits. The Commonwealth can only move beyond the
bounds of the statute, as this article has described, if defense attorneys
permit it.
1Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
2See Little v. Armentrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1245 (8th Cir. 1987)
(en banc) (where identification from victim was only evidence linking
defendant to crime, and identification came after hypnosis, court
reversed and remanded defendant's post-conviction habeas petition
which found failure to appoint a hypnotist was not error), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1210 (1988).
3Monahan, Obtaining Funds for Experts in Indigent Cases,
Champion, August, 1989.
4Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-169.1 (1990).
5Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-169.5 (1990).
6Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(A) (1990).
7Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(A) (1990).
8Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(A) (1990).
9Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(A) (1990).
1°Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(C) (1990).
1lVa. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(C) (1990).
12Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(D) (1990).
13Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(E) (1990).
14Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(E) (1990).
15Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
16Williams, 399 U.S. at 85.
17Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 606 (1972).
18Brooks, 406 U.S. at 609 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I
(1964)).
19Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 392-94 (1968) (un-
constitutional to force defendant to surrender fifth amendment right to
raise fourth amendment objection).
20Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(F) (1990).
2 1Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(F) (1990).
22Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264-3:1(G) (1990).
STATUS OF SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
HELPFUL TO CAPITAL DEFENDANTS
BY: STEVEN K. HERNDON
GINGER M. JONAS
The purpose of this article is to assist capital defense counsel in
their preparation for future cases by identifying and assessing the
current status of Supreme Court cases that have been particularly
helpful to capital defendants. First, some of the most useful Supreme
Court cases will be highlighted. Against this background, decisions
which suggest a retreat by the Court will be evaluated.
In its 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia,1 the United States
Supreme Court held that all death penalty statutes, as applied, were
unconstitutional because they failed to guide the sentencer's discre-
tion.2 In 1976, the Supreme Court struck down North Carolina and
Louisiana statutes containing mandatory death sentence provisions,
but upheld Georgia, Florida, and Texas death penalty statutes that
sufficiently guided the sentencer's discretion.
3
The 1976 decisions outlined the fundamental eighth amendment
requirements that death penalty statutes must comply with in order to
pass constitutional scrutiny. The constitutionally required elements
are that a statute must narrow the class of death eligible defendants,
and guide the jury's discretion to ensure an individualized determina-
tion on the appropriateness of the death sentence. 4 Since 1976, the
Court has further defined these principles, and subsequently established
the present constitutional boundaries of these fundamental eighth
amendment requirements.
AGGRAVATING FACTORS
I. Vague Statutory Aggravating Factors:
One of the approved means to guide jury discretion is to allow the
sentencer to consider certain factors that aggravate a homicide,
thereby setting it apart from an ordinary murder.5 However, some of
the general statutory terms employed for this purpose may be con-
stitutionally deficient.
In Godfrey v. Georgia,6 the Supreme Court held that a Georgia
trial court's application of an unconstitutionally vague aggravating
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factor violated the eighth amendment.7 In Godfrey, the statutory
aggravating factor required that the murder be "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim". 8 The jury
sentenced Godfrey to death upon a finding that the murder was
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhumane".9 The Georgia
Supreme Court had previously provided a narrowing construction for
the aggravating factor, which essentially required the jury to find that
the murder was committed through "torture". 10 However, the trial
court in Godfrey failed to instruct the jury according to the Georgia
Supreme Court's definition. 11 Furthermore, the Georgia Supreme
Court failed to review the sentence using the limiting construction.
12
The Supreme Court reversed Godfrey's death sentence due to the
Georgia Supreme Court's failure to adequately review the trial court's
application of the aggravating factor, a constitutional safeguard it had
performed in previous cases. 13 It said that there was nothing in the
words "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhumane" to
sufficiently guide the sentencer's discretion. 14 In previous acceptable
cases that term and the rest of the statutory phase, "in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim", had
been given the narrowing construction by the courts to ensure that the
jury's discretion was guided. 15
Godfrey implies that the mere addition of the phrase "torture,
depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to the victim" will not be
sufficient unless the jury had been given some constitutionally ac-
ceptable narrowing construction by the state court. Further, the
narrowing construction must either be communicated to the jury, or
applied by the state appellate court on review.
Eight years later in Maynard v. Cartwright,16 the Supreme Court
held an Oklahoma statutory aggravating factor requiring murder to be
"heinous, atrocious or cruel" to be unconstitutionally vague. 17 The
Court stated that the state legislature must guide the sentencer's
discretion so that on appellate review the court can determine if the
evidence supported a capital conviction. 18 The Court found that the
Oklahoma statute in Maynard failed to provide any standard to give
meaning to the statutory aggravating factor. The statute was not only
vague on its face, but the trial court also failed to provide any limiting
constructions to sufficiently guide the jury's discretion. 19 Therefore,
the Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma statute violated the eighth
amendment and reversed the defendant's death sentence.
20
Last term, the Supreme Court commented further on when a
vague aggravating factor is unconstitutionally applied.2 1 In Shell v.
Mississippi, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion disap-
proving a state court's limiting construction. 22 A Mississippi jury
sentenced Shell to death after finding the statutory aggravating factor
that the murderwas "especially heinous, atrocious, orcruel.' ' 23 In order
to avoid the constitutional problems addressed in Maynard, the trial
court defined the components of the aggravating factor in an effort to
provide a constitutionally sufficient limiting construction. The trial
court defined heinous as "extremely wicked or shockingly evil";
atrocious as "outrageously wicked or vile"; and cruel as "designed to
inflict high degree of pain with indifference to, or even enjoyment of,
the suffering of others." 24 Justice Marshall stated in his concurring
opinion that the trial court's limiting construction only defined "cruel"
more concretely than the supplemental instructions used in Maynard.25
While the court did not address whether "cruel" was permissibly
defined, it stated that even assuming it was permissibly defined, the
jury was still left with two impermissible definitions of the aggravating
factors: "heinous" and "atrocious". 26 The possibility that the jury
based the death sentence on one of these factors required the Court to
reverse the sentence. 27
The holdings in Godfrey, Maynard, and Shell have proven ben-
eficial to capital defendants by requiring that statutory aggravating
factors be specifically tailored to narrow the class of death eligible
defendants and to give meaningful guidance to the jury. However, the
Court has procedurally restricted these eighth amendment requirements
in two other cases.
First, in Clemons v. Mississippi,28 the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded a death sentence based upon both a valid and an invalid
aggravating factor.29 The jury sentenced Clemons to death after
finding that two aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating fac-
tors.30 The aggravating factors included a finding that the murder was
(1) committed during the course of a robbery for pecuniary gain; and
(2) that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." 31 In
light of the holding in Maynard, the Court found the second aggra-
vating factor invalid.32 However, the Court remanded the case to the
state appellate court to clarify its balance of the remaining aggravating
factor against the mitigating factors. 33 Thus, the Court left open the
possibility that instead of awarding the defendant a new sentencing
hearing, the Mississippi appellate court could preserve the death
sentence by either reweighing the valid aggravating and mitigating
factors or conducting harmless error analysis.
34
Another case procedurally restricting the eighth amendment
requirements is Lowenfield v. Phelps.35 In Lowenfield, the Court
upheld a defendant's death sentence based on an aggravating factor
which was a duplication of an element of the offense.36 It stated that
"petitioner's argument that the parallel nature of these provisions
requires the sentence to be set aside rests on a mistaken premise as to
the necessary role of aggravating factors. '37 The Court stated that use
of aggravating factors is not an end in itself, but rather a means of
narrowing the class of death eligible defendants and guiding the jury's
discretion in determining the appropriateness of the sentence. 38 Be-
cause the Louisiana statute in question limited the class of death
eligible defendants through a narrower capital offense definition, the
Court stated that the finding of an independent aggravating factor was
not necessary. 39 In light of the Court's holding in Lowenfield, it is still
unclear whether a state, which limits the class of death eligible
defendants through a narrower capital offense definition, must still
provide for aggravating factors during the sentencing stage.
Overall, Godfrey and its progeny are still helpful law for capital
defendants. This is especially true in Virginia where the Godfrey
aggravating factor is used, and the narrowing constructions are con-
stitutionally suspect if they are given to the jury at all. See Falkner,
The Constitutional Deficiencies of Virginia's "Vileness" Aggravat-
ing Factor, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 19 (1989). As the
particular case may require, counsel should be sure the trial record
reflects objections to unconstitutional applications of statutory ag-
gravating factors, particularly Virginia's vileness factor.
II. Relevancy in Sentencing:
While the concept of relevancy of mitigation evidence is very
broad, the Court has held that the constitution requires a more limited
scope of relevancy with regard to aggravating factors.40 Because
aggravating factors are to guide the jury's discretion, the Court has
stated that the factors should focus the jury's attention on the
defendant's culpability and the circumstances of the crime.
41
In its 1987 decision in Booth v. Maryland,42 the Court directly
addressed whether victim impact statements were constitutionally
permissible.43 The Maryland statute in question required the pros-
ecution to issue a pre-sentencing report to the jury which included a
victim impact statement.44 The victim impact statement provided the
jury with information on the family's personal characterizations of the
victim, the crime, the defendant, and the emotional impact of the
crime upon them. 45
The Supreme Court found that the victim impact statement
violated the eighth amendment and that the state statute was invalid to
the extent it required the jury to consider the statement.4 6 The Court
stated that such information is irrelevant to a capital sentencing
decision because the jury must focus its attention on the background
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and record of the defendant and the particular circumstances of the
crime.47 It further stated that the statement's "admission creates a
constitutionally unacceptable risk because the jury may impose the
death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner."48 Such state-
ments could divert the jury's attention away from the defendant and
toward punishing him according to the family's grief. 49 Once death
sentences are based upon the jury's sympathy for the victim's family,
then it would be impossible to distinguish rationally between cases in
which the defendant received death, and cases where the defendant
received a life sentence. 50 Quoting from its decision in Gardner v.
Florida,51 the Court noted that death sentences must "be, and appear
to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion".
52
In South Carolina v. Gathers,53 the Supreme Court expanded
further on its decision in Booth.54 In Gathers, the Court found that the
defendant's death penalty was imposed in violation of the constitution
when the prosecutor read, during closing arguments, from a prayer
found in the victim's possessions and argued the personal worth of the
victim based upon the prayer and a voter registration card.55 The Court
stated that prosecutor's statements were similar to the victim impact
statement used in Booth because the prosecutor's statements tended to
divert thejury's attention away from its properfocus on characteristics
suggesting heightened individual culpability of the defendant.
56
The Court's decisions in Booth and Gathers are helpful prece-
dent for capital defendants. These cases serve as a useful basis to keep
prejudicial evidence from the jury during the penalty phase of the trial.
To date, the Supreme Court has not issued an opinion which under-
mines the importance of these cases.
JURY'S ROLE IN CAPITAL SENTENCING
The fundamental requirements established in the Court's 1976
decisions have been applied in several areas regarding the jury's
involvement in capital murder trials. Of greatest importance are the
Courts decisions regarding jury selection and jury responsibility in
determining the appropriate sentence.
I. Jury Selection:
The standard traditionally employed to excuse a juror for cause
based upon his beliefs about the death penalty has been substantially
relaxed.57 In its 1968 decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois,58 the Su-
preme Court established that prospective jurors may be excluded for
cause if the juror makes it "unmistakably clear" that he would
automatically vote against the death penalty or that he could not be
impartial as to guilt. 59 While not overruling Witherspoon, the Court
relaxed this standard in Wainwright v. Witt.60 In Witt, the Court stated
that a prospective juror no longer had to make it "unmistakably clear"
that he would not vote for the death penalty or could not be impartial
as to guilt; rather, if his attitudes toward the death penalty would
"prevent or substantially impair" the performance of his duties as
instructed by the court and required by under oath, then the court
should excuse him for cause. 61 In addition, it noted that the trial
judge's determination of whether to excuse a juror for cause is a
finding of fact subject to a presumption of correctness in habeas
actions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). 62 In Gray v. Mississippi,
63
the Court held that a trial judges erroneous exclusion of ajuror was not
subject to harmless error analysis even though the prosecutor had
peremptory challenges remaining at the conclusion of jury selec-
tion. 64 Thus, if a juror with reservations about the death penalty is
nevertheless qualified to sit under Witherspoon and Witt, it is preju-
dicial error to exclude her.65 This is true in spite of the fact that the
prosecution contends that it had peremptory challenges it would have
used against the juror had the trial judge ruled properly and allowed
her to be qualified.
66
While not overruling Gray, the later case of Ross v. Oklahoma,67
illustrates that not every error by the trial judge regarding qualifica-
tion of jurors will entitle the defendant to relief. In Ross, the Court
found that a trial judge's failure to exclude a prospective juror, who
stated that he would automatically vote for the penalty of death if the
defendant was adjudged guilty, did not require a reversal because the
defense counsel used a peremptory challenge to remove the juror.
68 It
stated that there was no constitutional deficiency in the makeup of the
jury because the defense counsel "cured" the error by using a pe-
remptory strike to exclude the prospective juror from the panel.
69
Defense counsel in this position faces the dilemma of either
preserving an appellate issue by allowing the challenged juror to be
empaneled, or using one of the limited number of peremptory strikes
and losing the issue. The latter course is probably the best alternative.
The Court has not decided whether the seating of the unqualified juror
would automatically be an error if defense counsel had the opportu-
nity to "cure" the error, but instead used his peremptory strike on other
prospective jurors who had not been challenged for cause.
II. Jury Responsibility:
With the appropriate statutory guidance, the jury is solely re-
sponsible for making the determination as to the appropriateness of
the sentence.70 The Supreme Court has looked unfavorably on
attempts to undermine the jury's responsibility.7 1 In Caldwell v.
Mississippi,72 the Courtreversed a death sentence where theprosecutor
suggested, during closing arguments at the sentencing phase of the
trial, that the jury was not responsible for the determination of the
appropriate sentence.73 The prosecutor suggested that the responsi-
bility of determining the appropriate sentence did not rest with the jury
because the Mississippi Supreme Court would review the case on
automatic appeal.74 The Supreme Court found that the prosecutor's
statement violated the eighth amendment's heightened need for reli-
ability in determining the appropriate sentence in a specific case.
75
However, the Court later found that a prosecutor's emotional
arguments and personal characterization of the defendant did not
infect the trial with unfairness so as to deny the defendant due
process. 76 In Darden v. Wainwright,77 the Court held that the
prosecutor's reference to the defendant, as an "animal" who should
only be let out of prison on a leash, did not render the trial unfair.78
This seems to be distinguished from Caldwell on the basis that the
prosecutor's statement did not undermine the jury's responsibility for
determining the appropriate sentence.
One area of jury responsibility which has proven less helpful to
capital defendants is the Court's standard of review for arguably
misleading jury instructions.79 In Boyde v. California,80 the Court
reviewed arguably misleading jury instructions used during the sen-
tencing phase of the capital murder trial.81 It noted that several
standards of review have been applied to determine whether the jury
instructions did mislead the jury.82 The standards of review have
ranged from what a reasonable juror could have understood the
instructions to require, to a substantially possibility that the jury may
have rested its verdict on improper grounds.83 The Court announced
that the standard of reviewing would be "whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged jury instructions in
a way that prevents consideration of constitutionally relevant evi-
dence."'84 This standard shifts a previously announced analysis which
reviewed how a reasonable juror would interpret the instructions, to
the new standard which focuses on how the jqiy would interpret the
instructions. 85
However, in Cage v. Louisiana,86 a per curiam opinion issued in
November of 1990, the Court used the "reasonable juror" standard to
review jury instructions used in the guilt phase of a capital murder
trial.87 It found that a "reasonable juror" could have interpreted the
jury instructions to permit a conviction on a standard below the
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fourteenth amendment requirement of "beyond a reasonable doubt".88
While the jury instructions did state that the jury must find guilt
"beyond a reasonable doubt", the Court observed that it also equated
reasonable doubt with "grave uncertainty" and an "actual substantial
doubt".89 The ordinary meaning of these terms was found to require
a higher degree of "doubt" for an acquittal than the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard. 90 Therefore, the defendant's conviction
and death sentence was reversed and the case remanded. 91 It is pos-
sible that the Court's decision in Cage has shifted the standard back
the to the "reasonable juror."
In essence, the court has retreated from some of its earlier
standards involving the jury selection. The present standard to excuse
a juror for cause is whether the juror's attitude would prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties. 92 While the Court
has emphatically prevented prosecutors from misleading juries about
their responsibility to determine the appropriate sentence, there remains
uncertainty about the standard of review when jury instructions




When dealing with issues of mitigation, the United States Su-
preme Court has consistently held that the sentencer must be allowed
to consider ay relevant evidence offered by the capital defendant for
a sentence less than death. As a result, Supreme Court decisions
concerning mitigation offer the most helpful case law to the capital
defense.
Mitigation is "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as
a basis for a sentence less than death. '93 Thus, as long as the in-
formation offered is relevant to the defendant or to the crime committed,
there should be no limit to what the defendant can present at trial as
mitigation.
I. U.S. Supreme Court Mitigation Decisions
In Lockett v. Ohio,94 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
consider whether Ohio violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments
by sentencing Sandra Lockett to death pursuant to a statute that
narrowly limited the sentencer's discretion to consider the circum-
stances of the crime and the record and character of the offender as
mitigating factors. In Ohio, once the trier of fact found the defendant
guilty of aggravated murder, the death penalty would be imposed
unless the sentencing judge determined that one or more of the
following mitigating circumstances was established by apreponderance
of the evidence:
I. The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
2. It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed,
but for the fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or
strong provocation.
3. The offense was primarily the product of the offender's
psychosis or mental deficiency, though such condition is
insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
95
Because of the Ohio sentencing procedure, the judge was unable
to consider factors such as Lockett's minor role in the crime, her lack
of specific intent to cause death, her prior record which included only
minor offenses, and evidence which tended to show she could be
rehabilitated.
The Supreme Court concluded that:
The eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect
of a defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death.
96
Thus, in Lockett, the Supreme Court virtually invalidated limits
on the presentation of mitigation evidence. Lockett is an effective
precedent for the capital defendant when mitigation evidence is at
issue.
In Eddings v. Oklahoma,97 the Supreme Court applied the rule
announced in Lockett to the actions of an Oklahoma trial judge
because the judge refused, as a matter of law, to consider in mitigation
the defendant's turbulent family history and his emotional disturbances.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court and found such
evidence especially relevant because the defendant was only 16 years
old at the time he committed a capital offense. 98
The Eddings Court announced the broad rule that "state courts
must consider all relevant mitigating evidence" that the defendant
offers. 99 Thus, Eddings helps the capital defendant by requiring
consideration of mitigation evidence that Lockett permits to be of-
fered.
In 1987, the Court reaffirmed the rules announced in Lockett and
Eddings in Hitchcock v. Dugger.100 The Court granted certiorari to
determine whether Florida's death penalty statute, which contained
enumerated mitigating circumstances, unconstitutionally precluded
both the advisory jury and the sentencing judge from considering (I)
certain evidence of mitigating circumstances that had been introduced
and (2) additional evidence that had been withheld by defendant's
counsel in the reasonable belief that it could not be considered under
the statute.
The Florida death penalty statute in effect at that time provided
for separate post-conviction proceedings to determine whether those
convicted of capital crimes should be sentenced to life imprisonment
or death. Both an advisory jury and the trial court were required to
weigh statutory aggravating circumstances against statutory mitigating
factors in determining the defendant's fate. 10 1 In sentencing the de-
fendant to death, the sentencing judge found that "there [were]
insufficient mitigating circumstances as enumerated in Florida
Statute 921.141(6) to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
1 02
A unanimous Supreme Court held that, due to the statutory
requirement, the defendant was sentenced to death in proceedings that
did not comport with the requirement that the sentencer may neither
refuse to consider nor be precluded from considering any relevant
mitigating evidence.
A year later, the Court determined that a death penalty statute
which requires a jury to unanimously agree on the existence of any
mitigating circumstances in order to introduce that evidence into the
weighing process violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 10 3
Petitioner challenged the state of Maryland's death penalty
statute which required the jury to unanimously agree on the existence
of any mitigating circumstances. Thus, the jury was not free "to
consider all relevant evidence in mitigation as they balanced aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances." 104 The statutory requirement
was impermissible because, the Court determined, "it is not relevant
whether the barrier to the sentencer's consideration of all mitigating
evidence is interposed by statute, by the sentencing court, or by an
evidentiary ruling." 105
The Court reaffirmed its belief that "under our cases, the sentencer
must be permitted to consider all mitigating evidence." 106  "The
possibility that a single juror could block such consideration and
consequently require the jury to impose the death penalty, is one we
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dare not risk." 107 Thus, the Mills decision makes it reversible error to
mislead a jury into thinking that particular mitigating factors must be
unanimously agreed upon.
One favorable 1990 decision for the defense, which reaffirmed
the Court's Mills decision, was McKoy v. North Carolina. 108 InMcKoy,
the Supreme Court held that North Carolina's sentencing scheme,
which required the jury to agree unanimously on the existence of
every mitigating circumstance proffered by the defense, unconstitu-
tionally limited the jurors' consideration of mitigation evidence. The
Court emphasized that the Constitution strictly limits a state's ability
to narrow the sentencer's discretion to consider relevant evidence that
might persuade it to decline to impose the death penalty.
Thus, in McKoy, the Court expanded its holding in Mills v.
Maryland, 109 by stating that its decision regarding the consideration
of mitigating evidence is not limited to those cases in which the jury
is required to impose the death penalty if it finds that aggravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances or that no mitigating
circumstances exist at all. 110
Some recent Supreme Court decisions tend to undermine the
previously announced standard of allowing the sentencer to consider
any and all information in mitigation. In Saffle v. Parks, I I the Court
held that the petitioner was not entitled to federal habeas relief
because he was requesting that the Court apply a new rule which
stated that an antisympathy instruction violated the eighth amendment.
Parks argued that an antisympathy instruction was barred by
Lockett and Eddings "because jurors who reach sympathetically to
mitigating evidence may interpret the instruction as barring them
from considering that evidence altogether."' 12 Characterizing Parks'
claim as one contesting the ability of a state to dictate the manner in
which a jury may consider mitigating evidence, the Court said, "there
is a simple and logical difference between rules that govern what
factors the jury must be permitted to consider in making its sentencing
decision, and rules that govern how the State may guide the jury in
considering and weighing those factors in reaching a decision.""
13
The Parks decision may indicate that the Court intends to slowly
change established mitigation case law. However, because the Court
did not directly rule on whether or not the jury instruction was
constitutionally permissible, Parks is basically an advisory opinion
on the issue of mitigation. In dicta, the Court indicated that the
antisympathy instruction might be permissible under the what/how
dichotomy, because the Court noted, "Lockett and Eddings do not speak
directly, if at all, to the issue presented here: whether the State may
instruct the sentencer to render its decision on the evidence without
sympathy."114
Also, Justice Antonin Scalia recently called into question the
future of Lockett as a helpful precedent for the capital defendant in
Walton v. Arizona.115 Scalia's concurring opinion in that case an-
nounced that it is impossible to understand why "the Constitution
demands that the aggravating standards and mitigating standards be
accorded opposite treatment." 1 6 Scalia stated that in the future he
would not vote to uphold an eighth amendment claim that the
sentencer's discretion to consider mitigation was unlawfully restricted
in the sentencing phase of a capital trial. He also said that he would
no longer abide by the Court's Lockett decision.
None of the other eight Supreme Court Justices joined Scalia's
concurring opinion in Walton nor indicated that the Lockett decision
was outdated. Thus, Lockett is still a helpful precedent for the capital
defendant and should be used when courts try to limit the jury's
consideration of mitigation evidence.
II. Conclusion
Fortunately for the capital defendant, most of the Supreme Court
decisions regarding mitigation stress that the sentencer must be
allowed to consider any relevant evidence offered by the defendant
for a sentence less than death. Thus, the Lockett line of cases are still
effective precedents for the capital defendant. However, as indicated
by the 1990 Supreme Court decisions, the state may be able to
structure the sentencer's consideration of mitigation evidence through
the use of statutes and instructions to the jury.
SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS
I. Introduction
Throughout the years, the United States Supreme Court has
placed limits on the types of crimes and the classes of defendants
qualifying for the death sentence. Those limits are generally based
upon the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment and upon personal characteristics of the defendant. What
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment must be assessed at any
given time by reference to "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society." 1 7 Thus far the Supreme Court
has not found the death penalty cruel and unusual in all cases.
I. Supreme Court Decisions
A. Victim Not Killed
In 1977, the Supreme Court held that "death is indeed a dispro-
portionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman" when that
woman was not killed. 118 The Court reasoned that a rapist should not
be punished more heavily than a deliberate killer as long as that rapist
did not take the life of his victim. Thus, imposition of the death
penalty in this case violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 119 How-
ever, had a homicide occurred in this case, imposition of the death
penalty would not have been disproportionate.
B. Accomplices
Another case favorable to the capital defendant, Enmund v.
Florida120 held that the death penalty was a disproportionate pun-
ishment for a person who aided and abetted in the commission of a
murder but "did not kill or intend to kill.' 121 Reiterating its decision
in Lockett v. Ohio,122 the Court emphasized "individualized consid-
eration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sen-
tence."1
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InEnmund, the Court said putting to death one who aids and abets
an offense "does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of
ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts." 124 Thus, under the
Enmund decision, death is an inappropriate sentence for one who only
aids but does not execute the actual offense.
Five years later, in Tison v. Arizona,125 the Supreme Court seemed
to limit its Enmund holding by announcing that the death penalty is not
a disproportionate punishment for one who was not the triggerman,
but who played a major role in a felony murder and acted with reckless
indifference to human life. 126 In Tison, the defendants entered a
prison with a chest filled with guns, armed their father and another
convict, helped to abduct and rob a family of four and then watched
their father and the other convict murder the members of that family.
Neither defendant made any effort to help the victims.
The Court held that "the reckless disregard for human life
implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry
a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state ... that
may be taken into account in making a capital sentencingjudgment."1
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Thus, defendants who make a major contribution to a felony and
display reckless indifference to human life may be punished with
death even though they did not actually commit the offense.
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C. Age
After examining several state statutes, a plurality of the Court in
1988 decided that the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition of the
eighth amendment "prohibits the execution of a person who was under
16 years of age at the time of his or her offense." 128 The Court de-
termined that less culpability should be assigned to a crime committed
by a juvenile due to the juvenile's inexperience, lack of education,
vulnerability to peer pressure, and inability to properly evaluate the
consequences of his or her conduct. 129 Thus, when a capital punish-
ment statute specifies no minimum age for who may be eligible for the
death penalty, offenders who commit capital crimes before they reach
age 16 cannot be sentenced to death under Thompson.
More recent decisions by the Supreme Court are less helpful to
the defense in establishing substantive limits of the death penalty. In
1989 the Court held that imposition of the death penalty on any person
who murders at 16 or 17 years of age "does not offend the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment."
130
In reaching its decision, the Court examined various state stat-
utes. The Court determined that no consensus existed against death
sentence eligibility for all juvenile offenders because 22 states at that
time allowed 16 year olds to receive the death penalty. Thus, unless
a state legislature specifies otherwise, 16 and 17 years olds are eligible
to receive the death penalty.
D. Mental Retardation
Additionally, in Penry v. Lynaugh,131 the Court said that there
was "insufficient evidence of a national consensus against executing
mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses for us to
conclude that it is categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amend-
ment."
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Mental retardation may be offered as mitigating evidence by
capital defendants. However, the Court in Penry concluded that while
mental retardation may lessen a defendant's culpability for a capital
offense, it could not conclude that "the eighth amendment precludes
the execution of any mentally retarded person ... convicted of a
capital offense simply by virtue of their mental retardation alone."'
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III. Conclusion
Although the Court has placed some limits on who may be
eligible for a death sentence, those decisions indicate that substantive
limits may be redefined by the legislature or current public opinion.
As it stands now, the death penalty is disproportionate for criminal
offenders under the age of 16; for those who rape but do not kill their
victims; and for those who aid in an offense but do not play a major
role in its commission. Those who fall outside those categories may
be subjected to a sentence of death unless state death penalty statutes
offer more substantive limits on the imposition of the death penalty.
At the present time, the United States Supreme Court appears to have
reached its limit in identifying types of crimes and classes of people
which are not subject to the death penalty.
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A WORD OF THANKS
AND
A CONTINUED APPEAL
Last Spring we noted that the cost of publishing and mailing Capital Defense
Digest is quite significant. We noted further that the Digest is intended to serve
the Commonwealth, that its purpose is to assist capital defense counsel by
increasing the fund of knowledge available to the entire legal community,
including judges and prosecutors. We asked that those who believed that the
Digest is helpful and should continue in the widest possible distribution
consider defraying a portion of the cost.
The response has been gratifying, and we hope it will continue. The amount
contributed does not represent a major percentage of the publication cost but it
is a clear endorsement of the continuing need for the Digest.
The suggested sum is $10.00. Checks should be made payable to Washing-
ton and Lee University and mailed to:
Capital Defense Digest
School of Law
Washington and Lee University
Lexington, VA 24450

